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Abstract Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation
to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about
not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: (A) the picture
surface, (B) the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and
(C) the three dimensional depicted object. As (B) and (C) can come apart, we get a
more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where
the notion of twofoldness, which has played an important albeit controversial role in
understanding picture perception is replaced by the concept of threefoldness.
Keywords Picture perception  Picture surface  Depiction  Twofoldness 
Attention
1 Introduction
How does my mind work if I see an apple in a picture? And how is this mental state
different from my mental state when I see an apple face to face?
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It seems that when we are looking at a picture we see not one but two things: the
depicted apple and the picture of the apple.1 The two dimensional picture surface
(which is the actual object in front of you) and the three dimensional object depicted
in the picture. So one crucial question any account of picture perception needs to
clarify is whether we really do see both of these things and if so, how it is possible to
see two things at the same time (at the same region of my visual field).
There seem to be only three options here:
i. We only see the picture surface, not the depicted object
ii. We only see the depicted object, not the picture surface
iii. We see both the picture surface and the depicted object
Option (iii) itself comes in two very different forms:
iii (a) We see both the picture surface and the depicted object but we alternate
between seeing the surface and seeing the depicted object
iii (b) We see both the picture surface and the depicted object and we see them
simultaneously
According to option (i), we do not really see the depicted object. As it is not present,
maybe we only imagine that it is there. Or maybe we imagine our experience of the
picture surface to be an experience of the depicted object (this is Walton 1990’s
account). But we do not strictly speaking see the depicted object. There are many
challenges to making it precise what this ‘imagining one’s experience of the surface
to be of the depicted object’ means. Moreover, it is not at all clear whether this
extremely complex imaginative episode is something we humans are capable of at
all, let alone all those non-human animals that are apparently capable of picture
perception. Further, if we go down this route, we can no longer say that seeing an
apple in a picture is one way of seeing an apple (or, having a perceptual experience
of the apple as seen in the picture is one way of having a perceptual experience of
the apple). Instead, it is a way of imagining seeing the apple.
Option (ii) denies that we really see the picture surface. This is an odd and
somewhat desperate view, as the picture surface is right in front of us and we are
staring at it. There is an important example of seeing pictures where the surface does
not seem to figure in our perceptual experience, and that is the way we are meant to
perceive trompe l’oeil pictures—at least for a split second. Trompe l’oeil paintings
deceive the eye (hence the name): they fool us into thinking that we see the depicted
object face to face—before realizing that we see a picture. But not all pictures are
trompe l’oeil pictures. So even if it is true that we only see the depicted object but
1 One difference between seeing an apple face to face and seeing a picture of the apple is that in the
former case the apple needs to be there if I am to really see it face to face (as opposed to hallucinate it).
But in the case of seeing the apple in the picture, the apple does not need to be there (and, in the vast
majority of cases, it is not in fact there). In this paper, I will follow the accepted terminology of glossing
picture perception as seeing something in a picture. Those more precious about their use of the term
‘seeing’ may want to read it as ‘seeming to see’ (see Hopkins 2012 on this concept in the context of
picture perception). I will come back to these considerations in Sect. 5.2.
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not the surface when looking at (and being fooled by) trompe l’oeil pictures, this is
clearly not true in general.
Option (iii (a)) is normally attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Ernst Gombrich. His
account of picture perception is that we see both the surface and the depicted object,
but we never see the two at the same time. We oscillate between seeing the canvas
and seeing the depicted scene. While I described this view as a case where we see
both the picture surface and the depicted scene, it may be more appropriate to
describe it as a way of combining (i) and (ii). Specifically, the proposal is that our
perceptual state oscillates between (i) and (ii). But then this view will inherit at least
some of the problems of option (i) and (ii).
Finally, the most widely discussed way of thinking about picture perception is (iii
(b)): we simultaneously see both the two dimensional picture surface and the three
dimensional depicted scene. Option (iii (b)) is often labelled as the Twofoldness
Claim. When we see something in a picture we have a twofold perceptual state: we
see the surface and the depicted object simultaneously (see Wollheim 1980; Walton
1990, pp. 300–301; Walton 2002, p. 33; Nanay 2005; Feagin 1998; Levinson 1998;
see also Hopkins 1998, esp. pp. 15–17; Maynard 1994, esp. pp. 158–159; see also
Lopes 2005; chapter 1; Kulvicki 2006, pp. 172–173 for somewhat critical
overviews).
2 The Twofoldness Claim
Again, the Twofoldness Claim, that is, option (iii (b)) is that when we see something
in a picture we have a twofold perceptual state: we see the surface and the depicted
object simultaneously. There is something odd about the Twofoldness Claim as it
stands: if we see these two very different things simultaneously, how is it possible
that our visual experience is not disjointed (or confused)?
Robert Hopkins argues against the Twofoldness Claim by pointing out that it
does not capture the phenomenology of picture perception (Hopkins 2012). If it
were the case that we have perceptual experience of two very different things
simultaneously (the two dimensional surface in our egocentric space and the
depicted scene not in our egocentric space), this would lead to a disjointed or
confused overall perceptual experience. But this is not the kind of experience we
have when we look at pictures. There may be other ways of getting around this
worry, but I want to suggest that we should turn to philosophy of perception for a
little help.
In outlining the four options above, I was implicitly equating ‘seeing’ with
‘having a conscious perceptual experience of’ or ‘visually attending to’. And the
disjointedness worry about the Twofoldness Claim is only a worry if ‘seeing’ is
interpreted this way. But we know from philosophy of perception (and from
hundreds of subliminal priming experiments) that there are many ways of seeing
something. First, seeing can be conscious or unconscious (Marcel 1983; Weiskrantz
1997). Second, we attend to some but not all the objects and properties we see
(Mack and Rock 1998; Simmons and Chabris 1999). The relation between these two
distinctions is complicated because the relation between attention and consciousness
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is complicated: it is not clear whether attention is necessarily conscious, for example
(probably not, see Cohen et al. 2012; Jiang et al. 2006; Kentridge et al. 1999, 2008).
In order to bypass these worries, I will focus on the distinction between attending
to something we see and not attending.2
We do not attend to most of the things that are in our visual field. In fact, we
attend to very few properties of very few things most of the time. And, as the
inattentional blindness experiments show, what we are attending to and what we are
not attending to has an important impact on our perceptual experience (Mack and
Rock 1998). Here is probably the most famous of the inattentional blindness
experiments (Simmons and Chabris 1999). You see a clip where people pass a
basketball around. You are supposed to count how many times the team whose
members are dressed in white pass the ball among themselves. Most participants
who do this fail to notice that a man in a gorilla costume walks across the screen
comfortably and takes up a significant part of the screen for a long period of time.
Given that their attention is directed elsewhere (to the passing of the basketball),
many subjects are completely unaware of this. If there is no counting task to
perform, everyone immediately notices the gorilla.
One way of interpreting this experiment is that we are not conscious of those
objects or properties that we are not attending to: we are not conscious of the gorilla
because we didn’t attend to it. Consciousness requires attention: if we do not attend
to something, we will not become conscious of it. While I myself think that this
interpretation is basically correct, I will not rely on this here—as there is an
alternative interpretation according to which you were conscious of the gorilla, but
you immediately forgot it. On this view, we could talk about inattentional amnesia,
not inattentional blindness (see Wolfe 1999). For present purposes, all I need to
assume is that the allocation of attention influences our experience of the perceived
objects significantly. Crucially, priming studies show that even unattended objects
(like the gorilla) can prime us (that is, it disposes us to be quicker to recognize
stimuli that have something to do with gorillas Mack and Rock 1998). This shows
that whether or not the unattended object is not experienced or experienced very
briefly and then forgotten immediately, it is nonetheless perceived (presumably
unconsciously) and that is why it can have a priming effect. In short, we can see
objects with or without attending to them.
How do these considerations apply if we turn to picture perception? If we allow
for different ways of seeing something, then we will have more than the four options
I outlined above. We can see the picture surface with or without attending to it, and
the same goes for seeing the depicted scene. A plausible interpretation of the
Twofoldness Claim would be that we do not normally attend to the picture surface
when seeing things in pictures. We attend to the depicted scene. Now, we can attend
to the picture surface and this way of attending will play an important role when we
try to understand the aesthetic appreciation of pictures (see Clark 1960, p. 17,
2 We could also use the conscious/unconscious distinction, as long as we take the unattended stimulus to
be unconscious (as we should in the light of empirical evidence, see Cohen et al. 2012; Prinz 2010;
Schwitzgebel 2007 for philosophical summaries but see also Lamme 2003 for a dissenting view).
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pp. 26–27). But normally, we only attend to the depicted scene, not the picture
surface.3
Remember the worry about the Twofoldness Claim that it would imply some
kind of disjointed or confused experience, where properties of the depicted scene
are thrown in together with the properties of the picture surface. This worry
disappears if we take the picture surface to be unattended. Just as the unattended
gorilla fails to show up in our experience of the basketball game, so the unattended
properties of the picture surface (in normal cases) will also fail to show up in our
experience of the picture. As a result, these properties are not in the position to make
this experience disjointed.4
One may worry that while this way of thinking about picture perception manages
to avoid the disjointedness objection, we only do so by endorsing another
problematic assumption, again, about the phenomenology of picture perception.
And this new problematic assumption is that seeing something in a picture is very
similar to, maybe even indistinguishable from, seeing the same thing face to face. If
the surface is not attended, whereas the depicted object is, then presumably it is the
depicted object and not the surface that will show up in our phenomenology. But
while this may be so with trompe l’oeil pictures (or maybe even with naturalistic
pictures), it is clearly not the case when we are looking at impressionist,
expressionist, cubist or pretty much any depictions that are not hyper-naturalistic. I
think this is an important problem that all accounts of picture perception need to
address, and I will do this at the end of this paper (when all the conceptual resources
for doing so are at our disposal). I will argue that we can preserve the force of some
of these considerations without facing some of the problems of the Twofoldness
view if we add an additional third fold. But before turning twofoldness into
threefoldness, I need to clarify a potential confusion about the concept of
twofoldness that comes from conflating questions about picture perception and
questions about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures.
3 I myself defended at various places a specific version of this view, where the picture surface is
represented dorsally (by means of the dorsal visual subsystem) and the depicted object is represented
ventrally (by means of the ventral visual subsystem) (Nanay 2008, 2011, 2015). In short, the two (more or
less) separate visual subsystems (see Milner and Goodale 1995; Jeannerod 1997; but see also Schenk and
McIntosh 2010 for some controversies about just how separate these two subsystems are) normally
represent the same properties. But in the case of picture perception they represent different properties: the
dorsal visual subsystem represents the properties of the picture surface, whereas the ventral visual
subsystem represents the properties of the depicted scene. What I say about picture perception in this
paper is consistent with the dorsal/ventral account but it does not depend on it.
4 For a somewhat related strategy for downplaying the salience of the picture surface in our experience
(in a very different conceptual framework), see Polanyi (1970).
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3 Picture perception versus the aesthetic appreciation of pictures
It is very easy to confuse the philosophical debate about picture perception with the
philosophical debate about aesthetic appreciation of pictures. In fact, arguably, two
of the founding fathers of the depiction literature, Ernst Gombrich and Richard
Wollheim, both slide back and forth between these two very different questions.
The aesthetic appreciation of pictures is often characterized as the appreciation of
pictures as pictures. Consequently, the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is clearly a
subcase of picture perception. Not all instances of picture perception count as the
aesthetic appreciation of the perceived picture. More often, indeed in the vast
majority of cases, we see something in a picture but we do not appreciate the picture
aesthetically—we do not appreciate the picture as a picture. When you are watching
a sitcom or commercials on TV, when you flip through the in-flight magazine or
when you look at the drawings on the emergency procedure leaflet, you see things in
pictures. But you are unlikely to appreciate these pictures aesthetically (although, of
course, it is not impossible). One may appreciate what is depicted in a picture
without appreciating the picture as a picture.
So there are really two different questions about picture perception: what happens
in our mind when we see things in pictures and what happens in our mind when we
see pictures in a way that we also appreciate them aesthetically. The answer to these
different questions is bound to be very different.
How is it possible then that both Gombrich and Wollheim seem to have given the
same answer to these questions? Were they so confused that they failed to make this
simple distinction? Or were they so highbrow that they just couldn’t look at pictures
and not appreciate them aesthetically? A more natural way of reading these
philosophers (and I will focus on Wollheim here) is that they had two independent
proposals, one about picture perception in general and one about the aesthetic
appreciation of pictures. And they—fittingly for Gombrich—oscillated between the
two without noticing.
Richard Wollheim took seeing both the picture surface and the depicted object
simultaneously to be a crucial feature of both picture perception in general and of
the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. Assuming that he was not confusing picture
perception and the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, he must have meant different
things by ‘seeing’ in seeing the surface and the depicted object simultaneously when
addressing the two questions. And we can and should indeed keep these two very
different claims apart—as long as we use the appropriate concept of seeing.
We have seen that one way of making the proposal about simultaneous seeing
work when it comes to understanding picture perception (not appreciation) is to
bring in the concept of attention and to argue that while we do simultaneously see
both the surface and the depicted scene, we do not simultaneously attend to both—
we are only attending to the latter. But those special cases in which we are
aesthetically appreciating pictures are different. Then, in addition to simultaneously
seeing both the surface and the depicted scene, we also attend to the surface and the
depicted scene simultaneously. Each time we see something in a picture, we see
both the surface and the depicted scene. We can attend to either—although we
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normally attend to the latter only. But we can direct our attention to the picture
surface as well as to the relation between the two. And this is what happens when
we appreciate pictures aesthetically. The aesthetic appreciation of pictures is a form
of picture perception where our attention is exercised in a special manner.
To make things more confusing, the account of the aesthetic appreciation of
pictures I outlined in the last two paragraphs is also often labelled as the
‘Twofoldness claim’: in order to appreciate a picture aesthetically, one needs to
exercise twofold attention: attending to both the picture surface and the depicted
object. Richard Wollheim, who introduced the term ‘twofoldness’, as we have seen,
did not make a distinction between these two claims and he did not make a
distinction between the two different concepts of twofoldness that are in play when
addressing these two very different questions (see Nanay 2011 on where Wollheim
used which of these two concepts of twofoldness).
But then each time we talk about twofoldness, we need to make it clear which of
the two concepts we have in mind. The concept of twofoldness we should take
seriously in the context of picture perception is the simultaneous perceptual
representation of surface and depicted object. It is twofoldness in this sense that has
been argued to be necessary for picture perception. And the concept of twofoldness
we should take seriously in the context of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is
the simultaneous perceptual attention devoted to both the picture surface and the
depicted scene. It is twofoldness in this sense that has been argued to be very
important for understanding the aesthetic appreciation of pictures.
It could be thought that it is unfortunate that both of these very different
phenomena are called ‘twofoldness’, and we could blame Wollheim for confusing
the reader and making two very appealing ideas much less appealing by blurring the
difference between them. But I want to suggest that we may have had good reasons
to run these two arguments together (acknowledging that they are different). Our
perception of pictures is a twofold perceptual state: we perceive both the picture
surface and the depicted object. This is true of all of our picture perception, whether
or not aesthetic in nature. And this claim is silent about what we are attending to.
When we see a picture, we can attend to various features of this picture. We can
attend to the depicted object only: this is what happens normally. But we can also
attend in a twofold manner: to both the surface and the depicted scene. If this
happens, we are in the realm of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. And for this
we need twofold attention.
Allowing for an explanation of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is an
important desideratum for any account of picture perception. And the Twofoldness
Claim has some impressive explanatory simplicity in this respect: the Twofoldness
Claim, understood as an account of picture perception, already provides all the
conceptual resources for understanding the aesthetic appreciation of pictures.
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4 From twofoldness to threefoldness
The Twofoldness Claim is a good starting point for understanding picture
perception. I started this paper with the general question about the relation between
the two things we seem to perceive when we look at a picture: the two dimensional
picture surface and the three dimensional depicted object. If this is the question,
then the Twofoldness Claim is an appealing answer. But I want to argue that we
need to ask a different question.
When talking about picture perception, we need to consider not two, but three
entities. They are the following:
A: the two dimensional picture surface
B: the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes
C: the three dimensional depicted object
The novelty is the distinction between B and C, which many of the proponents (and
critics) of the Twofoldness Claim have treated interchangeably. B and C have very
different ontological status. B only exists because the picture exists: all the features
of B are determined by A and A alone: by the marks on the two-dimensional
surface. This is not true of C: in the case of a photograph of my grandmother, C is
my grandmother and her features are not determined by A. B is a virtual object: it is
fully determined by the marks on the picture surface given the rules of optics and it
has only perceptible properties (whatever these may be, see Siegel 2006; Nanay
2013 for a summary).
So while B and C often do seem similar (for example in the case of naturalistic
pictures), this is not always so. B and C may look very different as long as the
picture is not fully naturalistic. Caricatures provide a clear example. When we look
at a caricature of, say, Mick Jagger, C is Mick Jagger himself. But B, the three
dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes, has very different features
from Mick Jagger himself. B typically has thicker lips, for example. To use a
slightly more highbrow example, in one of Henri Matisse’s portraits of his wife,
Madame Matisse’s face appears to be entirely green. So B’s face is green, but C’s
face (that is Madame Matisse’s face) is not green at all. A final, quite trivial
example: in the case of black and white photographs, B has no color. But C does.
Again, B and C will look very different unless the picture is fully naturalistic. But
even in the case of fully naturalistic pictures, B is not the same as C. B is determined
by A alone, whereas C is not. B and C may look similar (in the case of naturalistic
pictures), but they are different entities. Further, B does not even need to be a
possible three-dimensional object. Some of Escher’s drawings encode a three-
dimensional object that is a blatant impossibility. So here B would be an impossible
object. C, in contrast, cannot be an impossible object.
Neither B nor C needs to be fully determinate. For example, in the case of the
black and white photograph, B’s color is only minimally specified, if at all. And in
the case of pictures that depict entities completely made up by the artist, B is our
only guide to how C may look like.
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The distinction between B and C is not entirely new. Robert Hopkins makes a
somewhat similar distinction between ‘seeing-in content’ and ‘pictorial content’
(Hopkins 1998, p. 128). But note that Hopkins’s distinction has a much narrower
scope—as it was introduced in order to salvage his account of depiction from
potential objections (especially from the objection that the picture’s outline shape
may resemble more than one depicted objects). See also Abell (2009, pp. 91–92) for
a critical analysis of Hopkins’s distinction and Abell (2010, esp. pp. 83ff), where
she makes a distinction between internal and external objects that is very similar to
the distinction I made here (and where she also talks about the example of black and
white photographs).
Lambert Wiesing, relying on Husserl, also makes a similar distinction in Wiesing
(2009), where he distinguishes between image object and image subject. Wiesing,
like me, makes a threefold distinction between the image-carrier, the image-object
and the image-subject. These three entities would roughly correspond to what I call
A, B and C: the two-dimensional picture surface, the three-dimensional object
visually encoded in the picture and the depicted object.
The emphasis of Wiesing’s discussion is the image-object, which has a mere
‘artificial presence’ (Wiesing 2009, p. 35). And this emphasis also helps us to see
the differences between my approach and Wiesing’s. Wiesing, again, following
Husserl, takes the image-object to be the representation, which represents the image
subject and he understands this representation relation as a version of resemblance
(Wiesing 2009, pp. 36–38). The image carrier does not represent anything, it merely
‘displays’ the image-object and it is the image-object that does the representing.
This is very different from the way pictorial representation is understood in the
Wollheimian/Gombrichian tradition (one important exception is Briscoe forthcom-
ing), where it is the picture surface that is taken to be the pictorial representation
(see also Kulvicki 2014, pp. 19–20 for discussion).
Here, things get a little complicated. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that
Wiesing’s threefold distinction can be mapped onto mine (more on this in Sect. 5.1
below), we can say that for Wollheim, A represents B (although given that he does
not distinguish between B and C, he sometimes does seem to say that A represents
C). For Wiesing, B (which is displayed by A) represents C. For me, A represents C
(by means of visually encoding B). This is a major difference between my threefold
distinction and Wiesing’s (another difference is discussed in Sect. 5.3 below). But
the real questions in this paper are not those of pictorial representation, but of
picture perception and the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. So we need to ask how
we represent these three folds.
Again, we need to account for the representation of not two but three folds. The
question is how they fit together. I take picture perception first and then turn to the
aesthetic appreciation of pictures afterwards.
In the case of picture perception, if we want to use the insights of the twofoldness
view without running into the difficulties it faces, we need to resolve the ambiguity
between whether the label ‘the depicted scene’ refers to B or C: to the three
dimensional object visually encoded in the surface or the actual depicted scene.
And I want to resolve this ambiguity in favour of B. It is B, the three dimensional
object visually encoded in the surface, that we perceive. And we also perceive A,
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the picture surface. This is, so far, not a threefold, but a twofold view of picture
perception. C does not have to be perceived and sometimes it may not even be
represented either. If I don’t know how Mick Jagger looks, I will still perceive a
person in the picture when I’m looking at the caricature. There is picture perception,
but in this case, C is not even represented. But when C is represented, it is
represented quasi-perceptually—by means of mental imagery.
5 The three folds
More slowly, we need to go through the three folds that the Threefoldness account
posits and examine how they are represented in perception (and whether they all
need to be so represented). I take the three folds in turn.
5.1 The picture surface (A)
The first fold is that of the picture surface and the threefoldness account (like the
twofoldness account) claims it is perceptually represented, but not necessarily
perceptually attended to.5
We have some empirical reasons to think that the picture surface is perceptually
represented even if it is not (always) attended to. The first empirical reason is simple
and straightforward (see Hagen et al. 1978), but only takes us to the claim that the
picture surface is sometimes perceptually represented. Take two displays: an object
depicted in a picture and the very same object (of the same size) behind a screen or
colored glass. There is a significant difference between our judgment of the size of
the object in these two displays (even if the picture depicts it in a trompe l’oeil
manner). As the depicted/perceived object is of the same size in the two displays
and, presumably (at least in the case of the trompe l’oeil depiction) our perception of
them is also the same. But then the difference in our assessment of the object’s size
must be influenced by the perception of the picture surface in the first display. This
perception may be inattentive and, as a result (especially in the case of the trompe
l’oeil picture) it may be unconscious. But unconscious perceptual states can still
prime us in various ways and influence our actions, decisions and judgments.
A more complicated reason for thinking that the picture surface is perceived (but
not necessarily attended to) has to do with a widely discussed topic in the
psychology of picture perception: the perception of pictures from an oblique angle.
An odd fact about the psychology of picture perception is that if our position
changes in front of the picture, our view of the depicted object does not change
(Vishwanath et al. 2005; Cutting 1987; Goldstein 1987; Halloran 1989; Pirenne
1970; Polanyi 1970; Wollheim 1980, pp. 215–216; Matthen 2005, pp. 315–317).
Even if we look at a picture from an oblique angle, we don’t see the depicted scene
as distorted. This is surprising and needs to be explained, as the projection of the
5 This is not a trivial claim: just because the picture surface is right in front of us, this does not mean that
it is perceptually represented. An alternative would be to say that we only represent the depicted scene
perceptually—the picture surface is not perceived at all.
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depicted object on our retina is very different from the way it is when we look at the
picture head on.
The standard way of explaining this phenomenon is to say that we are
perceptually aware of the orientation of the picture surface and this awareness
compensates for the oblique view: that is why we do not see the depicted object as
distorted. This proposal goes back at least as far as Pirenne 1970’s analysis,
allegedly inspired by a letter by Albert Einstein (see Pirenne 1970, pp. 99f).
I simplified this problem significantly (see Kulvicki 2006; Busey et al. 1990;
Maynard 1996; Nanay 2011 for less simplified versions; see also Koenderink et al.
2004, p. 526 for a dissenting view). There are cases where there is no such
compensation: when we are looking at ceiling frescos from an oblique angle, for
example, we do see the depicted scene as distorted. And this difference may give us
a clue about how the picture surface is represented in perception. But even
bracketing these complications, we can conclude that the picture surface is
perceptually represented and that is the reason why perceiving pictures from an
oblique angle does not lead to distortions. This was one of Wollheim’s original
reasons for talking about the simultaneous perception of surface and the depicted
object (Wollheim 1980, pp. 215–216).
5.2 The three-dimensional object visually encoded in the surface (B)
It may seem uncontroversial that the three-dimensional object visually encoded in
the surface (B) is also perceived. When I see an apple in a picture, an apple shows
up in my experience somehow. But it is not clear whether it is B (three-dimensional
object visually encoded in the surface) or C (the actual depicted apple) that shows
up in my experience. I will come back to this question at the end of the subsection—
until then, I want to remain noncommittal about this and will just say ‘apple’ as a
placeholder for ‘B or C’.
The real question is whether the apple shows up in my perceptual experience—
and this is far from being clear. In fact, those who insist that imagination plays a role
in perceiving pictures will deny this. They will say that we do not perceptually
experience the apple: we only experience the surface and we imagine our
experience of the surface to be the experience of the apple. But the experience of the
apple is an imagined experience—not a perceptual one (Walton 1990).
Further, it may also be questioned whether we in fact need to experience the
apple—perceptually or non-perceptually. Perception, as we have seen, can be
conscious or unconscious. And picture perception can also be conscious or
unconscious. Many (even most) of the experiments that demonstrate unconscious
perceptual processes (for example, in unilateral neglect patients and blindsight
patients as well as in the subliminal priming or inattentional blindness paradigm) are
in fact conducted on subjects facing pictures (Strahan et al. 2002; Eimer and
Schlaghecken 2003; Greenwald et al. 1996). Thus, any general account of picture
perception, psychological or philosophical, should be applicable to both the
conscious and the unconscious instances of picture perception. In the case of
unconscious picture perception, we do not experience anything—we do not
experience the apple either. But we do perceive the apple unconsciously: it is the
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perception of the apple (and not of the marks on the surface) that primes us to
behave in certain ways without knowing that we have encountered the apple.
And this emphasis on unconscious picture perception may give us a reason to
mistrust the imagination-based accounts of picture perception. If picture perception is
taken to be conscious, then, in spite of all the criticisms of imagination-based accounts,
we can at least make sense of the idea of imagining one experience to be another: of
imagining the experience of the picture surface to be the experience of the apple. But it
is difficult to even formulate this account in the case of unconscious picture perception.
Even if we allow for the possibility that mental imagery can be unconscious (Nanay
2010b; Philips 2014), imagining one experience to be another is an imaginative
episode that seems by definition conscious (aswhatwe imagine to be something else is
something conscious: an experience). The imagination-based accounts of picture
perception may or may not work for conscious picture perception; but they are
extremely unlikely to work for unconscious picture perception.
But dismissing the imagination-based accounts of picture perception will not give
us any positive reason to think that the apple is perceptually experienced (in the case
of conscious picture perception). It is difficult to tell apart perceptual experiences
from non-perceptual ones. But regardless of how strict one is about the perceptual
versus non-perceptual phenomenology distinction, we have good reason to hold that
the apple is part of our perceptual phenomenology—it is perceptually experienced.
Consider so-called ‘aspect dawning’ pictures (Lopes 2005), like the famous picture
of the Dalmatian. When you look at this picture, first all you see is a bunch of black
patches in front of a white background. But eventually you see a Dalmatian in this
picture.Where a moment ago all you saw were patches now suddenly you see a dog in
the picture. Further, all the contours of the dog that you now see are illusory contours—
like the sides of the Kanizsa triangle: there are no marks on the paper that would
correspond to the contours of the Dalmatian (but see Cavedon-Taylor 2011 for some
important differences between these two different kinds of illusory contours). In other
words, whatmakes pictures of this kind special is that before you get to see the dog, you
do not see these illusory contours—you see them only once you see the dog in the
picture. Your phenomenology clearly changes when you suddenly get to see the dog.
But the question is whether your perceptual phenomenology changes. Suppose it
doesn’t. In this case, your perceptual phenomenology would have to be what it was
when you thought you were looking at the nonfigurative marks on the paper. All the
changes in your phenomenology after you recognized that this is a picture of a dog and
not an abstract composition are changes in your non-perceptual phenomenology. Even
if we assume that the dog itself is not perceptually experienced, the surface properties
are clearly very differently experienced after the transition—the illusory contours, for
example, are only experienced afterwards. And once one experiences the dog, it is not
possible not to be aware of these illusory contours. Thus, even if we restrict the
perceptual phenomenology to the picture surface and exclude the dog, the perceptual
phenomenology still changes as a result of seeing something in the picture.6 But then
6 Further, it is not just perceptual phenomenology that changes, but even the activation of direction-
specific neurons in the primary visual cortex (see Teufel et al. in press), which makes it even more
problematic to consider these changes to be driven by non-perceptual mental states.
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the initial assumption, namely, that the dog is part of our non-perceptual
phenomenology, becomes completely ad hoc: we would need to postulate all the
following processes in order to hold onto this assumption: we perceptually experience
the picture surface, we non-perceptually experience the dog and this non-perceptual
experience then modifies our perceptual experience of the picture surface (providing
the illusory contours, for example). It may not be impossible to argue for this way of
describing the case, but it entails the ad hoc postulation of a non-perceptual experience,
and a top-down influence from this experience to the perceptual experience. A non-ad
hoc way of describing how aspect dawning pictures work would be to say that the dog
is part of our perceptual phenomenology and it is the perceptual experience of the
Dalmatian that makes it possible for us to perceptually experience the illusory
contours (that we did not experience before we became aware of the dog). No need to
postulate either an ad hoc non-perceptual experience or an ad hoc top-down influence.
Does this argument show that B is perceived or that C is perceived? It should be
clear that if this argument goes through, it only shows that B is perceived. It is possible
that while B is perceived, C is not—it is non-perceptually represented—see below.
The argument I gave in this subsection is consistent with this view. If this argument
shows that the ‘dog’ or the ‘apple’ is perceived, this is to be understood as claims about
B: about the three dimensional object visually encoded in the surface: the argument
shows that we perceive the three dimensional object visually encoded in the surface.
5.3 The depicted object (C)
So far I argued that A (the picture surface) and B (the three dimensional object
visually encoded in the surface) are perceptually represented when we see things in
pictures. However, the treatment of third fold, C, is more complicated.
First of all, C does not have to be perceived and sometimes it may not even be
represented either. If I don’t know how Mick Jagger looks, I will still perceive a
person in the picture when I’m looking at the caricature. There is picture perception,
but in this case, C is not even represented.
When I do recognize the picture as the caricature of Mick Jagger, then C is
represented, but it is presumably not perceptually represented: I am not perceiving
Mick Jagger himself. But then how can we explain that when I recognize the picture
as the caricature of Mick Jagger, my phenomenology changes?
I didn’t represent Mick Jagger before. I represent him now. And this changes my
phenomenology. The question is how Mick Jagger is represented. I will argue that
Mick Jagger (and C in general) is quasi-perceptually represented: represented by
mental imagery (see Nanay forthcoming on mental imagery).
The first thing I need to argue for is that C is not represented non-perceptually. A
straightforward alternative to my view would be to say that C merely shows up in
our judgment—neither perceptually nor quasi-perceptually. This is Edmund
Husserl’s and Lambert Wiesing’s view (see Wiesing 2009, pp. 70–78).7 (And this
7 This also seems to be what is implied by some other way of describing the Gestalt switch in the case of
seeing the duck-rabbit figure. As Bill Brewer says, for example: ‘‘[T]he difference is no change in the
core subjective character of the experience; it rather concerns our classificatory engagement… This is
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constitutes another major difference between Wiesing’s threefold distinction and
mine.)
An initial problem with this line of the argument is that it would also make it
difficult to explain why, after having recognized Mick Jagger in the caricature, our
perceptual experience of the lines and shapes of the surface (i.e., of A) changes. The
proponent of this view could posit a non-perceptual experience with cognitive
phenomenology, which then has some kind of top-down effect on our perceptual
phenomenology, but this would lead this view into more and more complicated and
more and more ad hoc ways of describing what is going on in situations of this kind
(further complicated in the case of Brewer’s claim by findings about how patterns of
eye movements and Gestalt switches are correlated see Einha¨user et al. 2004).
Further, and more importantly, this way of thinking about C contradicts some
empirical findings. As we have seen, when we see black and white photographs, B is
a three dimensional object visually encoded in the picture that has no color and C is
the colorful depicted object. So recognizing that what is depicted in a black and
white photograph is not grey but, say, red or yellow is an instance of recognizing C.
And this can be and has been empirically studied—for more than 50 years. Here is a
famous experiment (Delk and Fillenbaum 1965; see also Hansen et al. 2006; Witzel
et al. 2011 for more recent and methodologically more rigorous studies): if we have
to match the color of a picture of an orange heart to color samples, we match it
differently (closer to the red end of the spectrum) from the way we match the color
of a picture of some other, orange shapes. This shows that our recognition of the
object in question (the heart) influences the color we experience it as having. So
when we recognize C, we perceive the color of the surface to be different from
before (when we haven’t recognized C). But given that color is one of the few
properties that is widely agreed to be perceptually represented, this means that
representing C can and does change our perceptual experience.
This doesn’t in itself show that C is represented quasi-perceptually as it would be
possible that the non-perceptual representation of C influences, in a top-down
manner, our perceptual state. The problem here, again, is twofold: the blatant ad hoc
nature of this proposal and its conflict with empirical findings. In an experimental
setup that is similar to the one in the Delk and Fillenbaum study, subjects were put
in the fMRI scanner and the activation in the visual cortex, including the primary
visual cortex was different in those cases where the subject recognized C and in the
cases where she didn’t (Bannert and Bartels 2013). This means that those who insist
that C is represented non-perceptually (by a judgement), would need to posit a top-
down influence from some non-perceptual states to the primary visual cortex. And
while the primary visual cortex is subject to various attentional and crossmodal
influences, it is highly implausible that it would get direct input from our judgments.
How can we explain the change in the perceived color (and in cortical activity) in
this example then? How does the representation of C influence the perceived color
(and the cortical activity)? A straightforward proposal would be to say that it is the
Footnote 7 continued
[a] further phenomenology… Basic [perceptual] experiential presentation is common throughout.’’
(Brewer 2007, p. 93).
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mental imagery of C that influences the perceived color. You have a (not necessarily
very salient) mental imagery of the heart and this mental imagery (and the color red
that shows up in it) influences your perceptual experience of the orange heart-shape
(that is, it influences your perceptual phenomenology). Similarly, when you
recognize Mick Jagger, you have a (not necessarily very salient) mental imagery of
Mick Jagger and this imagery influences the way you see the caricature.8
This view was explicitly defended in Macpherson (2012) as an indirect
mechanism for cognitive penetration: mental imagery mediates cognitive penetra-
tion (in these Delk and Fillenbaum cases). But one doesn’t need to take sides in the
Byzantine cognitive penetrability debate to hold that mental imagery influences our
perceptual experience. And if C is represented by mental imagery, this can explain
why it changes cortical processing of, say, color, as mental imagery is widely held
to influence cortical processing, including processing in the primary visual cortex
(see Kosslyn et al. 2006 for a summary).
So this gives us the following picture: we have two perceptual states and (at least
in some instances of picture perception) also a quasi-perceptual state: the perceptual
representation of A and the perceptual representation of B, and we also have the
quasi-perceptual representation (that is the mental imagery) of C.9 And in order to
explain the phenomenology of seeing this picture as a caricature of Mick Jagger, we
need to take all three of these perceptual/quasi-perceptual states into consideration.
What makes this view of picture perception a threefoldness account (and not a
twofoldness account)? This view claims that there are two perceptual states only
that are involved in picture perception, not three: the perceptual representations of A
and of B. And some of the time (when C is not represented at all), this is the end of
the story: two folds only. But some other times, when C is represented, we need to
talk about not two but three perceptual/quasi-perceptual states: the perceptual
representations of A and B and the mental imagery of C. The move of bringing in
three and not two folds is important for three reasons. First, it allows us to identify
the perceptually represented folds as A and B (and not as A and C) and second, it
explains the phenomenological difference between not recognizing C in the picture
and recognizing it—in order to do so, we need to postulate a quasi-perceptual
representation of C. But, again, this quasi-perceptual representation of C is not a
necessary feature of picture perception.
The third reason why this is a threefoldness account becomes clear if we now
turn from the question of picture perception to the question of the aesthetic
appreciation of pictures. The first thing to note is that which one of these perceptual/
quasi-perceptual states (that are all part of our overall mental state when perceiving
pictures) is the most salient (and which ones remain unconscious) depends on our
pictorial interests. Correspondingly, we can attend to any of A, B and C and any of
the relations between them: we can attend to C, for example, if we want to find out
8 On non-salient mental imagery, see Philips (2014) and Nanay (2010b).
9 I take the concept of ‘quasi-perceptual’ to be fairly harmless: given the well-documented similarity (in
terms of processing Kosslyn et al. 2006; phenomenology Perky 1910; Segal 1972) between perception
and mental imagery, even if something is represented by means of mental imagery, we can say it is
represented quasi-perceptually (see Lycan 1995; Matthen 2005 on the concept of quasi-perceptual states).
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how Mick Jagger or Madame Matisse looks. We can attend to the relation between
B and C, when, for example, we want to assess how good the caricature is (or how
naturalistic a picture is). And we can attend to the relation between A and B if we
are interested in the way the marks on the surface give rise to three-dimensional
features. Attending to the relation between A and B has received a lot of attention
lately as a crucial aspect of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures (Budd 1995, p. 58;
Podro 1991, 1998; Lopes 2005; Hopkins 2010; Nanay 2010a). But attending to the
relation between B and C is important for another reason: for establishing the
accuracy of the picture. Further, attending to the relation between B and C can be
part of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures; when appreciating pictures aesthet-
ically, appreciating their naturalism or the lack thereof can be very important (see
also Hopkins 1997 for a related argument).10 If it is true that one desideratum on any
account of picture perception is that it should provide the conceptual resources for
understanding the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, then the third fold needs to be
part of any account of picture perception (because it needs to be part of any account
of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures). 11
And the introduction of the third fold may also help us to understand the
difference between perceiving a picture and perceiving a sculpture. In the case of
perceiving figurative sculptures, we also need to consider three entities: A, B and C:
the three dimensional clay/marble/bronze object (A), the three dimensional structure
encoded by this (B) and the three dimensional object/person seen in the sculpture
(C). While A and B can come apart (for example, in the case of bas-reliefs), they
often have the same contours. So the aesthetic appreciation of sculptures often
involves attending to the relation between B and C.
6 Twofoldness versus threefoldness
I gave a new account of picture perception that talks about not two but three folds.
One may wonder why we should multiply folds if we don’t need to. I want to
conclude with two considerations about why a threefoldness account is preferable to
a twofoldness account.
First, I argue that the threefoldness account is not susceptible to the objection we
considered in Sect. 2 that seems to jeopardize the twofoldness claim. We are finally
in the position to go back to the objection that any account of picture perception
must be able to account for the phenomenal difference between seeing something in
a picture and seeing the same thing face to face. If the surface is not attended, only
10 I don’t mean to suggest here that all properties that are relevant for the aesthetic appreciation of
pictures are relational ones between A, B and C. Here is yet another property, also a relational one, that is
also very important for our aesthetic appreciation of pictures. According to Matthew Kieran, ‘‘when we
truly appreciate a work, we appreciate […] the ways in which the artistry shapes and guides our
responses’’ (Kieran 2005, p. 213), where I take ‘‘the ways in which the artistry shapes and guides our
responses’’ to be a relational property that is partly determined by the artistry and partly by our responses.
11 The relation between A and C may also be aesthetically relevant, for example, in the aesthetic
appreciation of portraiture—where we appreciate the way the lines on the surface can capture some
important feature of the depicted person (C).
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the depicted object is, then presumably it is the depicted object and not the surface
that will show up in our phenomenology—and this sounds dangerously similar to
seeing the depicted object face to face. So the worry was that while the account of
picture perception I outlined above may be plausible for trompe l’oeil pictures or
maybe even with naturalistic pictures, it is clearly a crazy view when it comes to
any depiction that is not hyper-naturalistic.
We can now see that this objection is based on the conflation of B and C: of the
three dimensional object visually encoded by the surface and the depicted object
itself. It is B, that is, the three dimensional object visually encoded by the surface,
that we attend to, not C. As we have seen, the representation of C may color our
perceptual experience, but C itself is not something we normally attend to. B is what
we attend to and the experience of B (say, the green-faced Madame Matisse) is very
different from the experience of C (that is, the pink-faced Madame Matisse), that is,
the experience of the depicted person face to face.
In other words, we can maintain that when we see something in a picture, we
simultaneously see both the surface and what is in the picture: we normally do so by
attending to the latter and not the former. And this does not entail an experience
indistinguishable from (or even similar to) the experience of seeing the depicted
object face to face because what we are attending to is not the depicted object per
se, but the depicted object as it is depicted: the three dimensional object visually
encoded by the surface—B, not C.
We can, of course, also attend to the surface, as we have seen (when, for
example, aesthetically appreciating pictures). And we can also attend to the depicted
object itself—to C (when, for example, assessing the accuracy of the depiction). But
in all cases of seeing something in the picture, we need to attend to the three
dimensional object visually encoded by the surface—to B.
Finally, the second consideration in favour of the Threefoldness Claim is the
following: it allows for a more nuanced picture of the aesthetic appreciation of
pictures. As we have seen, one desideratum on any account of picture perception is
that it should provide the conceptual resources for understanding the aesthetic
appreciation of pictures. The Twofoldness Claim does this, but the resulting account
of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is not as rich as the account of the aesthetic
appreciation that we would get if we talked about not two but three folds. Some
properties that are very relevant for the aesthetic appreciation of pictures are, for
example, relational properties between B and C. And if we accept the threefoldness
view, the conceptual resources for this aspect of the aesthetic appreciation of
pictures are already present in the threefoldness account of picture perception.
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